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Abstract 
 
Abstract: Supply and demand responses to financial crises result in fluctuations in credit flow to the 
private sector. Policy makers concerned with the sustainability and growth of viable firms should 
disaggregate these responses. Utilising firm level data, this study investigates characteristics of firms 
applying for external finance before and after the financial crisis, along with characteristics of 
successful applicants. Notwithstanding changes in credit conditions, salient features of external 
financing demand endure across the period, including ownership, asset structure, age and size. 
Failure to secure debt in an earlier period does not deter firm owners from applying for loans in a 
subsequent period. Evidence suggests that the most financially distressed firms are suffering the 
greatest consequences of the credit crunch.   
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1. Introduction: Adequate resourcing of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is of paramount 
importance because of their contribution to gross value added (GVA) and employment (Ayyagari et al. 
2007). Provision of resources to small firms is a function of the willingness of funders to lend, 
combined with demand for investment finance. The preferred primary source of finance for small firms 
is internal equity, as they typically adhere to the pecking order theory (Mateev et al, 2013). If this 
source is inadequate for investment needs, firms seek finance externally, of which the most important 
source is bank debt (Beck et al., 2008). Reliance on bank finance causes SMEs to be particularly 
vulnerable if there is an abrupt and extensive disruption to the world financial system resulting in a 
credit crunch (Udell, 2009). Exposure to adverse effects of a credit crunch is intensified as small firms 
generally do not have diversified sources of external funding (Vos et al., 2007). It is further increased 
if a credit crunch is preceded by a period of expanded credit, during which firms may become reliant 
on debt finance (Hughes, 1997), and consequently accumulate large debt to assets ratios. The impact 
of tightened credit conditions may have a greater impact on firms in a poor liquidity position facing into 
the credit crunch (Mach and Wolken, 2012). This liquidity position is exacerbated if the credit crunch 
coincides with an economic recession, which can have a detrimental effect on activity in the real 
economy.  
Economic recession also results in a reduction in demand for finance from firms as they reappraise 
and delay investment decisions. Furthermore, firms contribute to the contraction in private credit flow 
by deleveraging (ECB, 2012). Thus, it is unclear to what extent the reduction in private sector credit is 
a result of supply or demand side responses to financial and economic shocks. Nonetheless, 
governments worldwide promote supply side measures to increase the flow of credit to businesses. 
Whether such intervention is justified or necessary, governments persist with programmes such as 
the Merlin agreement in the UK (HCBIS committee, 2011), and the Small Jobs Act 2010 in the US.  
Successive reports by central banks worldwide (e.g. CBoI, 2010, 2011, ECB 2012) suggest that total 
lending to SMEs in the period following the financial crisis declined significantly as the economic 
recession persisted. This reduction in credit may have been the result of prudent lending, as lenders 
decline loans to firms that represent a poor credit risk, the number of which typically increase during 
recession. Additionally, the large decline in lending to sectors that experienced a severe adverse 
shock may also be justified due to significant overcapacity. Having incurred significant losses, and 
facing greater capital reserve requirements and a need to shrink their balance sheets, the primary 
issue for banking institutions was to retain capital and bolster capital adequacy ratios (Honohan, 
2009).  
The recent financial crisis provides a valuable opportunity to assess the borrowing behaviour of firms 
in a period of expanding credit followed by a period of restricted lending. It also provides an 
opportunity to examine differences in the lending behaviour of financial institutions in a period of credit 
expansion, followed by credit contraction. Whilst a number of studies and reports provide valuable 
information about the financing environment for SMEs in the aftermath of the financial crisis (e.g. 
OECD 2009), a greater understanding of microeconomic issues can be gained by examining 
characteristics of firms seeking debt and equity finance, and identifying characteristics of successful 
applicants. This is important in order to examine if a particular type of firm reduces demand as the 
economy enters recession, or experiences a financing gap as credit conditions tighten. This 
information is valuable for policy makers attempting to mitigate the adverse effects of reduction in the 
supply of finance, along with reduced investment from the private sector.  
This study aims to address these contemporary issues and add to the literature by investigating firm 
owners’ applications for debt and equity before and after the financial crisis. Analysing firm level data 
collected from a representative sample of Irish SMEs, the study poses the following research 
questions: (a) are the profiles of firms seeking debt and equity finance significantly different after the 
financial crisis?; (b) does denial of credit in a preceding period result in discouragement to apply for 
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loans in following period?; and (c) are the profiles of firms receiving debt finance different after the 
financial crisis?. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, the literature relating to demand and supply 
of finance for SMEs is briefly reviewed, and hypotheses are formulated. Description of data, variables 
employed, regression models and method of analysis are described in sections 3 and 4. This is 
followed by presentation and discussion of results. Conclusions are then elaborated, followed by 
suggestions for firm owners and policy implications. 
2. Theoretical review and formulation of hypotheses  
The ability of SMEs to access finance is a recurrent subject in the literature, and the recent 
proliferation of studies on the issue is motivated by the effect of the financial crisis on small firms (e.g. 
Cosh et al., 2009, Fraser, 2009, Dennis, 2010). Although credit flow to the private sector is a function 
of demand and supply, these issues have traditionally been addressed separately in the literature. 
Demand-side studies typically examine personal and firm characteristics in seeking to provide 
explanations for observed financing patterns, and although empirical evidence varies a number of 
stylised facts have emerged. For example, combined evidence suggests that the pecking order theory 
holds for small firms (Mateev et al, 2013). Notwithstanding temporal changes in financing markets for 
SMEs, firm characteristic determinants may be expected to have a similar effect on loan demand and 
supply across all periods. In fact, it is proposed that firm characteristic effects may be even more 
pronounced because of procyclical lending behaviour by financial institutions (Ruis et al., 2009). 
Supply-side studies concern the efficiency of financial markets in providing adequate resources for 
SMEs. These studies predominantly address the provision of debt finance to the sector, and may be 
classified into two opposing theories. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) propose that there is insufficient 
supply of debt to small firms, and the resulting underinvestment means that equity is the equilibrium 
source of finance.  Alternatively, De Meza and Webb (1987) contend that overlending results in 
investment in excess of socially efficient levels, and therefore debt is the equilibrium source of 
finance. This broad literature forms the basis for hypotheses formulated in the following review.  
The external financing requirement of a firm depends on its growth opportunities, and whether they 
can be funded from internal resources. This may, in turn, depend on the stage of development, which 
is closely linked with the age of the enterprise. The most important source of finance in the early 
stages are personal resources of the firm owner, friends and family, which typically constitute the 
greatest part of capital structure at start-up (Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2011). These resources are 
commonly supplemented by short-term debt, but may also include long term loans which are often 
secured on the personal assets of the firm owner (Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). Younger firms 
have difficulty accessing debt, however, because of a lack of credit history (Diamond, 1989, Sánchez-
Vidal and Martín-Ugedo, 2012). Additionally, smaller firms have relatively greater agency costs, and 
consequently greater costs of alleviating information asymmetries due to economies of scale 
(Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008, Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). Furthermore, debt finance may not be 
appropriate, sufficient or available for various categories of firms (e.g. fast growth high-tech 
enterprises), and these firms typically seek finance in equity markets. This is particularly true for fast 
growth firms lacking collateral in the form of fixed assets with a requirement for large amounts of 
equity. These considerations give rise to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Smaller and younger firms have a greater demand for debt and equity finance 
H2: High growth firms have a greater demand for debt and equity finance 
H3: Gazelles have a greater demand for equity finance 
Another factor to take into account when investigating demand for finance is the firm owner’s 
preference for debt or equity. This is influenced by a number of requirements and considerations, 
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including ownership and managerial independence, which is one of the principal requirements for 
small firm owners (Poutziouris, 2003). Firm owners with this motivation eschew equity finance from 
outside investors, and use internal equity (Hirsch and Walz, 2011), resorting to bank funding if 
external finance is required. The need for control and independence is often determined by the legal 
form of the firm, as firms in closely held ownership (such as sole proprietorships, partnerships and 
family firms) are less likely to apply for external equity from new sources than firms in wider ownership 
(Poutziouris, 2002). By extension, firms seeking equity finance from new external investors are 
unlikely to apply for debt finance, and vice versa. Of course this may not be true for cash constrained 
firms, for whom survival rather than control is a first order concern. For some firms, indifference to 
debt or equity increases during times of financial crisis and economic recession, as liquidity becomes 
increasingly problematic. These issues give rise to the following hypotheses: 
H4: Closely-held firms have a greater demand for debt finance and a lesser demand for equity finance 
H5: Firms applying for loan finance will not apply for external equity in the same period 
Whilst reluctance to apply for debt finance is a consideration for firm owners seeking to retain control 
of the firm, an additional factor is discouragement related to perceived refusal of the requested 
funding (Kon and Storey, 2003). The level of discouragement is difficult to ascertain from secondary 
datasets, as discouraged borrowers simply do not apply for loans. One measure that can be 
employed, however, is whether firms have previously been refused debt finance. Firms that have 
been declined intermediated debt in times of expanded credit are likely to be even more discouraged 
in times of restricted credit. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
H6: Firms that have previously been refused loan funding will not apply for debt in a subsequent 
period 
Another factor that influences demand for debt and equity financing is the sector in which the firm 
operates. This is primarily due to differences in asset structure across sectors, and may also result 
from temporal differences in investment patterns. Previous studies have provided empirical evidence 
that industry sector influences capital structure (Hall et al., 2000, Brierley and Kearns, 2001), although 
other studies emphasise the primacy of firm specific effects (Jordan et al., 1998). This evidence 
suggests the hypotheses: 
H7: Firms in sectors typified by tangible assets apply for debt rather than equity finance 
H8: Firms in sectors typified by intangible assets apply for equity rather than debt finance 
The hypotheses generated above apply to the demand side of small firm financing, and it is 
suggested that the proposed effects are intensified in times of recession. For example, smaller and 
younger firms will likely have an even greater demand for finance during recession than their older, 
more mature peers which may have greater retained earnings to rely on. Similarly, the effect of 
discouragement is likely to be intensified as lending restrictions increase.  
On the opposite side of the debt contract, financial institutions are primarily concerned with the 
repayment of the capital sum plus interest. The difficulty with loan contracts is the imbalance in the 
structure of payoffs. If the borrower’s project does not succeed, the bank loses the full capital amount; 
whereas if the borrower makes exceptional returns, the bank receives a fixed margin (interest rate) 
plus capital, and the borrower retains the profits. Financial institutions seek to safeguard against these 
potential losses by employing a number of lending techniques. Primary among those are asset-based 
lending and relationship lending. Younger firms generally experience greater problems with 
information opacity, and may have difficulty in accessing debt. As a firm becomes established and 
develops a trading and credit history, reputation effects alleviate the problem of moral hazard 
(Diamond, 1989), facilitating borrowing capacity. Furthermore, it may be relatively more costly for 
smaller firms to resolve information asymmetries with banks, and consequently smaller firms may be 
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offered less debt capital, or capital at higher costs than larger firms (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). 
These considerations give rise to the hypothesis: 
H9: Younger, smaller firms are less successful in loan applications 
Previous studies find that growth, particularly high growth, is positively related to the proportion of 
external financing employed (Gompers and Lerner, 2003). Although access to finance is not without 
difficulty for high-growth firms (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), financial institutions appear to be 
favourable to resourcing a firm with growth prospects. This is supported by a number of studies 
reporting a positive relationship between growth and debt ratios (Johnsen and McMahon, 2005, 
Sogorb Mira, 2005, Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). It is proposed that 
H10: High growth firms are more successful in loan applications 
The asset structure of the firm has a significant bearing on the means of external finance employed, 
primarily because banks employ asset-based lending techniques when advancing debt to overcome 
potential agency problems of moral hazard. Collateral provides funders with security in the event of 
default, with maturity of the asset typically matching maturity of the debt. Indeed, Bartholdy and 
Mateus (2008) contend that asset structure is the single most important determinant of SME capital 
structures. Thus, it is proposed that 
H11: Sectors typified by tangible assets are more successful in loan applications 
The previous three hypotheses relate to the supply-side of SME financing, and are generally 
applicable in all prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Once again, the proposed relationships are 
likely to be even more acute in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Storey and Greene (2010) relate 
that rejection rates for term loans soared from 7.4% in the pre-recessionary period to over 16% in 
2008. Therefore, it is expected that younger, smaller firms will be even less successful in loan 
applications in the post-financial crisis period, for example.   
3. Data Collection and Description of Variables 
Data for this study was collected by the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) as part of a Eurostat 
project to examine issues related to access to finance by SMEs across the European Union. Survey 
data collected related to respondents’ loan and equity applications in 2007 and in 2010, and whether 
they were successful, partially successful or unsuccessful in applications to a variety of sources. The 
sample of businesses surveyed comprised independent firms in non-financial sectors employing 
between 10 and 249 persons in the year 2005, and continuing to employ at least 10 persons at the 
time of the survey. The sample was selected from NACE Rev 2 categories B to E (industry), F 
(construction), G, H, I, L, N (selected services), J (ICT services), and M (professional, scientific and 
technical services).  The target population was divided into strata according to NACE groups and 
growth categories. Growth is categorised in three groups, ‘gazelle’, ‘high growth’ and low growth’. 
‘High growth’ enterprises attained increases of 20% per annum in employment over the period 2005 
to 2008. ‘Gazelles’ were defined as high growth enterprises established between 2003 and 2005, and 
‘non high growth’ included all other enterprises. These firms appear in all sectors, with over 50% 
occurring in the services sectors. For strata with less than 75 enterprises, and for gazelles, a census 
was conducted. The rest of the sample was selected using proportional allocation. The survey was 
issued in September 2010, and closed in February 2011. Total sample size was 3,000 enterprises, 
and a response rate of 28% yielded 829 respondents. 
Variables selected to examine changes in characteristics of firms applying for, and receiving debt and 
equity finance before and after the financial crisis are described in table 1. As the questionnaire was 
addressed to firms in 2010, with retrospective questions about 2007, it is a balanced dataset. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to observe firms that have not survived in the intervening period. As 
these firms may have been financially distressed, credit rejections for 2007 may be understated, and 
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there remains an issue of survivorship bias. Additionally, effects related to discouraged borrowing 
may be understated as this cannot be directly observed, and previous loan refusal may not be an 
efficient proxy. 
 
  Table 1. Definitions and descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
Variable name Definition mean St. dev. N 
Dependent variables 
    
Apply loan 2007 1 if firm applied for debt; 0 otherwise. 0.372 0.484 866 
Apply loan 2010 1 if firm applied for debt; 0 otherwise. 0.307 0.462 866 
Apply equity 2007 1 if firm applied for equity; 0 otherwise. 0.033 0.180 866 
Apply equity 2010 1 if firm applied for equity; 0 otherwise. 0.043 0.202 866 
Bank Success 2007 1 if firm’s loan application successful; 0 
otherwise. 
0.314 0.464 866 
Bank Success 2010 1 if firm’s loan application successful; 0 
otherwise. 
0.154 0.361 866 
Independent variables     
Gazelle 1 if firm was high growth and established 
between 2003 and 2005; 0 otherwise. 
0.091 0.288 866 
High growth 1 if firm had an increase of 20% per annum in 
employment from 2005 to 2008; 0 otherwise. 
0.188 0.391 866 
Low growth 1 if firm was not ‘high growth’ or ‘gazelle’; 0 
otherwise. 
0.721 0.449 866 
Sizeclass 1 if firm has 50 – 250 employees; 0 otherwise. 0.154 0.361 866 
Lnage Natural log of the age of the firm from 
incorporation / establishment. 
2.860 0.644 842 
Own 1 if firm is sole proprietorship or partnership; 0 
otherwise 
0.157 0.364 851 
Bankfail 2007 1 if a firm applied for, but failed to secure a 
bank loan in 2007; 0 otherwise  
0.006 0.076 866 
Sectoral dummy 
variables 
    
Industry 1 if NACE Rev 2 is B to E; 0 otherwise 0.142 0.349 866 
Construction  1 if NACE Rev 2 is F; 0 otherwise 0.094 0.291 866 
Selected Services 1 if NACE Rev 2 is G, H, I, L, N; 0 otherwise 0.561 0.497 866 
ICT Services 1 if NACE Rev 2 is J; 0 otherwise 0.080 0.271 866 
Professional, scientific 
and other services 
1 if NACE Rev 2 is M; 0 otherwise 0.124 0.329 866 
  
4. Method of Analysis 
Research questions posed in this study were empirically tested using probit regression models with 
selection, which are expressed as a function of the characteristics: 
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Y = β0 + β1GAZELLE + β2HIGHGROWTH + β3SIZECLASS + β4LNAGE + 
β5APPLYEQUITY/APPLYLOAN + β3OWN + ε           (1) 
The binary choice probit model represents the probability that Y=1 for each given characteristic, i.e. 
the probability of a firm applying for (or receiving) finance in each period. Probit regression models 
with selection were estimated (Dubin and Rivers, 1989), as a significant number of respondents did 
not apply for finance in either period. Similarly, models examining success in accessing debt finance 
included only those respondents requesting bank loans. The model was estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), as normal distribution was assumed. Since probit model coefficients 
cannot be interpreted the same as ordinary least squares coefficients, marginal effects are estimated 
and reported in tables 2 and 3. Examination of Pearson correlation coefficients and variance inflation 
factors indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue.  
Hypotheses related to discouraged borrowers were tested by inclusion of the variable ‘Bankfail 2007’ 
in models related to bank applications in 2010: 
Y = β0 + β1GAZELLE + β2HIGHGROWTH + β3SIZECLASS + β4LNAGE + 
β5APPLYEQUITY/APPLYLOAN + β3OWN + β5BANKFAIL2007 + ε          (2) 
Sectoral differences in requests for, and success of financing applications included four dummy 
variables, Industry, Selected services, ICT Services, and Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services. Construction was selected as the reference sector in models estimated with industry 
dummy variables. The capital structure of the construction sector is markedly different from other 
sectors, primarily because of variations in asset structure. Additionally, expansion of the construction 
sector before the financial crisis (Gurdgiev et al., 2011) makes it an important reference group when 
investigating sectoral-specific differences in financing during this period. 
 
5. Results 
Marginal effects and coefficients of probit multivariate regressions relating to financing applications 
are reported in tables 2 and 4 (appendix A) respectively. Gazelles and high growth firms were more 
likely to apply for debt finance than low growth firms in 2007, as were high growth firms in 2010. High 
growth firms were also more likely than low growth firms to apply for equity finance in both periods, 
although surprisingly results for gazelles are insignificant. Firm size was positively related with the 
probability of applying for loans in 2010. Age was positively related with loan applications in 2007. 
These results lead to rejection of the hypothesis that smaller, younger firms have a greater demand 
for debt finance.  The probability of a respondent applying for debt was positively related to equity 
applications, and vice versa. Businesses with a sole proprietorship or partnership legal form had a 
greater probability of applying for bank finance than other limited liability firms in both periods. Firms 
with a wider form of ownership are more likely to apply for equity before the financial crisis. These 
results lead us to accept and reject hypotheses 4 and 5 respectively. Failure to secure a bank loan in 
2007 is strongly related with the probability of applying for loan finance in 2010, indicating that firms 
denied loans in previous periods are not discouraged from making subsequent applications. There 
are a small number of significant sectoral differences in financing applications in both periods. Firms 
in the construction sector were more likely to apply for intermediated debt than ICT services firms in 
2007. Similarly, firms in ICT services and the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services sectors 
were more likely to apply for equity finance than firms in the construction sector in 2007. 
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Table 2. Probit models for demand for finance: Marginal effects. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Apply Loan  2007 Apply loan 2010 Apply Equity 2007 Apply Equity 2010 
Firm-
characteristic 
 variables 
         
Gazelle 0.143** 
(0.066) 
0.126** 
(0.067) 
0.095 
(0.065) 
0.088 
(0.065) 
0.002  
(0.014)  
0.005 
(0.015)    
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.022)    
Highgrowth 0.132*** 
(0.048) 
0.134*** 
(0.048) 
0.086** 
(0.046) 
0.086** 
(0.046) 
0.024* 
(0.015)    
0.015 
(0.013)    
0.048** 
(0.023)    
0.044** 
(0.022)    
Sizeclass 0.028 
(0.049) 
0.028 
(0.050) 
0.090** 
(0.049) 
0.091** 
(0.049) 
-0.000 
(0.009)  
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.015 
(0.012)   
-0.013 
(0.012)  
Lnage 0.068** 
(0.029) 
0.058** 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
0.011 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.006)  
-0.004 
(0.006)  
-0.001 
(0.009)  
-0.002 
(0.009) 
Applyequity / 
Applyloan 
0.503*** 
(0.068) 
0.523*** 
(0.065) 
0.382*** 
(0.082) 
0.383*** 
(0.083) 
0.063*** 
(0.015)    
0.063*** 
(0.016)    
0.074*** 
(0.019)    
0.073*** 
(0.019)    
Own 0.104** 
(0.049) 
0.112** 
(0.054) 
0.120*** 
(0.049) 
0.134*** 
(0.053) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006)    
-0.006 
(0.014)  
-0.001  
(0.017)   
Bankfail 2007   0.433* 
(0.231) 
0.431* 
(0.228) 
    
Sectoral 
dummy 
Variables 
        
Industry  -0.030 
(0.069) 
 -0.031 
(0.065) 
 0.015 
(0.023)  
 0.014 
(0.027)   
Selected 
Services 
 -0.085 
(0.060) 
 -0.041 
(0.057) 
 0.006 
(0.012) 
 -0.008 
(0.019)    
ICT Services  -0.236*** 
(0.059) 
 -0.087 
(0.069) 
 0.055 
(0.052)  
 0 .014 
(0.032)  
Professional, 
Scientific and 
Technical 
Services 
 -0.100 
(0.071) 
 -0.077 
(0.067) 
 0.049 
(0.047) 
 -0.006 
(0.021) 
Multivariate probit regressions with selection are estimated in all cases. *, **, *** implies significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Marginal effects and coefficients of probit models investigating the probability of success in bank 
finance applications in 2007 and 2010 are reported in tables 3 and 5 (appendix A) respectively. 
Success in receiving the requested loan in the period preceding the financial crisis is primarily 
determined by the size and age of the firm. Sectoral differences in securing finance were not 
significant in the pre-crisis period. The probability of receiving loan finance in 2010 was negatively 
related with applications for equity. This suggests that firms seeking investment from multiple sources 
have a more acute financial requirement, and consequently a lower probability of securing the loan 
finance requested. The most notable feature of post-financial crisis lending is sectoral differences. 
Firms in the construction sector have a much lower probability of securing loan finance than firms in 
all other sectors. 
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Table 3. Probit models for ‘success in obtaining bank loans’: Marginal effects. 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
Bank Success 
2007 
Bank Success 
2007 
Bank Success 
2010 
Bank Success 
2010 
Firm-characteristic 
 Variables 
    
Gazelle 0.007 
(0.066) 
-0.002 
(0.068) 
0.103 
(0.110) 
0.103 
(0.113) 
Highgrowth -0.022 
(0.051) 
-0.013 
(0.051) 
-0.066 
(0.080) 
-0.082 
(0.081) 
Sizeclass 0.123*** 
(0.037) 
0.116*** 
(0.038) 
0.041 
(0.084) 
0.040 
(0.086) 
Lnage 0.063* 
(0.033) 
0.059* 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.054) 
0.002 
(0.056) 
Applyequity / Applyloan -0.112 
(0.089) 
-0.114 
(0.090) 
-0.282*** 
(0.092) 
-0.293*** 
(0.093) 
Own 0.042 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.048) 
-0.051 
(0.081) 
-0.059 
(0.093) 
Sectoral dummy 
Variables 
    
Industry  0.065 
(0.060) 
 0.303*** 
(0.11) 
Selected Services  0.011 
(0.063) 
 0.206** 
(0.109) 
ICT Services  -0.068 
(0.125) 
 0.341*** 
(0.115) 
Professional, Scientific 
 and Technical Services 
 -0.041 
(0.095) 
 0.245* 
(0.131) 
Multivariate probit regressions with selection are estimated in all cases. *, **, *** implies significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
SME demand for external resources before and after the financial crisis reveals similarities in 
characteristics of applicant firms. Not unexpectedly, high growth firms have a greater requirement for 
debt and equity finance in both periods. Medium sized firms have a greater demand for intermediated 
debt than small firms in 2010. One interpretation of this result is that surviving larger firms came under 
greater liquidity pressure as the recession progressed, resulting in a greater requirement for debt 
finance. This effect is more severe for firms accustomed to financing growth with high levels of debt in 
the preceding period of expanded credit. Thus, effects of credit contraction are more severe on these 
larger firms. Older firms, on the other hand, had a greater demand than younger firms for debt finance 
in 2007. In 2010 they may have access to greater reserves than younger firms, and consequently 
demand for debt may have decreased. 
Consistent with results in previous studies (Mac an Bhaird, 2010), closely held ownership is positively 
related with demand for debt and negatively related with demand for equity. This well established 
pattern is unchanged in both periods, although it would appear to be contradicted by positive 
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relationships between demand for debt and equity. These latter results may be explained by the fact 
that firms experiencing severe liquidity problems are more concerned with survival of the business 
than control or managerial independence. Contrary to hypotheses, failure to secure a bank loan in 
2007 did not deter respondents to apply for loan finance in 2010. Although this result does not refute 
the ‘discouraged borrowers’ theory, as discouraged borrowers cannot be directly observed, it provides 
evidence that previous refusal does not enhance discouragement. In fact, the opposite effect is 
observed. This is particularly true when one considers that discouragement in the post-financial crisis 
period could be even greater because of evidence regarding reduced lending to SMEs (e.g. OECD, 
2009). 
A small number of significant results suggest sectoral differences in demand for debt and equity. In 
2007 firms in the construction sector had a greater probability of applying for debt than firms in the 
ICT Services sector. One explanation for this result is that firms in the construction sector satisfy bank 
requirements for tangible assets to secure debt finance, and are therefore more likely to apply for debt 
than equity. Additionally, because of the boom in asset prices in the sector before the financial crisis, 
banks advanced increasing amounts of debt to construction firms (Honohan, 2009). This, in turn, 
resulted in further demand from firms in the sector. Equally, firms in sectors typified by intangible 
assets have a greater demand for equity finance throughout the period. In 2007, firms in ICT and 
Professional, Scientific and Technical services had a greater probability of applying for equity than 
debt finance. These results indicate that, even when there are significant changes in credit conditions, 
long established patterns of financing based on asset structure endure. 
The probability of receiving intermediated debt during the pre-crisis period was not determined by 
growth, but by size and age. This result is not unexpected, as relationship-based lending and asset-
based lending are two of the most commonly employed lending criteria employed by banks (Baas and 
Schrooten, 2006). It does, however, highlight the inefficiency of advancing debt finance on the basis 
of collateral rather than criteria such as growth or predicted cash flow. It also emphasises the inherent 
hazard to the lender of collateral-based lending policy, as in times of falling asset prices the residual 
value of the loan may not be fully covered by the collateral provided. This result provides a suggestion 
of the risks to Irish banks of a downturn in the value of collateral post 2007. 
Two significant features of bank lending are evident in the period after the financial crisis. Firstly, firms 
applying for both debt and equity in the same year have a lower probability of securing loans. This 
suggests that firm owners indifferent to the source of funding, and possibly with a more acute or 
immediate financing requirement, are more distressed or constrained than borrowers not seeking 
equity in the same time period. This result may be explained by the denial of finance to the most 
distressed or constrained applicants. Secondly, there is considerable variation in lending across 
sectors. Firms in Selected services, Professional, Scientific, and Technical services, and ICT services 
are 21%, 25% and 34% more likely to receive loan finance respectively than those in construction. 
Firms in Industry have a 30% greater probability of success in loan applications than construction 
based firms in 2010. This result may be attributed to a severe decline in growth prospects for the 
sector due to considerable overcapacity of housing stock (Whelan, 2009). Additionally, it evidences 
the sharp turnaround in economic activity from 2007 when there was a much greater concentration in 
the construction sector. 
A number of aspects of the demand for, and supply of finance are not addressed directly in this study, 
in the sense that they are not modelled in probit regressions. Firstly, it is difficult to ascertain to what 
extent changes in demand for finance have occurred because of reduced cash flow or lower 
profitability. It is, however, possible to gauge the severity of financial requirement by examining firms 
that apply for both debt and equity funding in the same period. Whilst theoretically it is proposed that 
firms have a preference for debt or equity, this may not be a first order concern for cash constrained 
firms. More concerned with survival, such firms may willingly accept finance from multiple sources. 
Thus, it can be reasonably suggested that firms applying for both types of funding in one period have 
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an acute need for finance. It is therefore not surprising that firms with a critical need for finance (as 
defined by making multiple finance applications) have a greater probability of being refused finance. 
Secondly, an increased financing constraint may arise from more onerous credit conditions, such as 
extra covenants or increased interest rates. Although these elements are not included in regression 
models, survey respondents do not perceive them as significant obstacles to growth and sustainability 
(CSO, 2011). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Access to external finance for SMEs in the aftermath of the financial crisis is a critical issue, as 
witnessed by the plethora of recent studies on the subject (e.g. Holton and O’Brien, 2011, Ullah et al., 
2011). Reduction in the use of debt and equity by small firms is due to a combination of demand and 
supply side factors. Whilst funders are advancing less finance than in the previous period of 
expanded credit (OECD, 2009, BIS, 2012), demand for resources from SMEs has also decreased as 
the private sector reduces investment (Cosh et al., 2009), and at the same time deleverages. Analysis 
of demand for finance of a representative sample of Irish SMEs indicates that growth, ownership, age 
and size are important factors before and after the financial crisis. Notwithstanding a more challenging 
financing and business environment in the post crisis period, firm owners’ financing preferences 
endure. This may not be true for firms in financial distress or experiencing liquidity pressure, however. 
Lending patterns indicate that firms applying for finance from multiple sources have difficulty in 
securing loans after the crisis, as do firms in the construction sector. Financial institutions are justified 
in refusing funding to firms which are a poor credit risk and in sectors with significant overcapacity, 
although they need to be consistent in credit appraisal, particularly during periods of credit expansion. 
In order to ameliorate the adverse effects of cyclical fluctuations in credit supply, lending criteria need 
to be consistently applied across all periods. It is of fundamental importance that lending decisions 
are made on the basis of investment appraisal, rather than asset-based techniques. Recent evidence 
suggests that reduced credit provision to the SME sector is a result of credit rationing rather than 
improved lending practices (McCann, 2011, Lawless and McCann, 2012), which does not bode well 
for small firms or lending institutions.  
Although precise explanations for reduced use of external sources of finance by SMEs are not 
straightforward, governments worldwide have launched a number of high-profile supply side initiatives 
to address the ‘problem’. Whilst these programmes are valued by small firms experiencing severe 
liquidity pressure through prolonged recession, policy measures should be more nuanced as it is 
unclear which firms are experiencing difficulties in accessing credit, or even if access to finance is the 
most pressing problem for small firms. In this way, policy makers can more effectively counteract the 
adverse effects of procyclical lending behaviour of financial institutions. 
The experience of SMEs through the recent financial crisis emphasises the importance of financial 
management. Firms overly dependent on external financing are exposed to the adverse effects of a 
credit crunch, which is exacerbated if the firm has accumulated large debt in a preceding period of 
credit expansion. Exposure to external fluctuations of credit supply can be lessened through judicious 
financial management, which acts as an ‘internal smoothing’ technique. This is especially important 
during periods of economic expansion, when firm owners are not as constrained by external 
conditions.   
  
12 
 
Appendix A. 
Table 4. Estimated probit regression coefficients for demand for finance models. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Apply Loan  2007 Apply loan 2010 Apply Equity 2007 Apply Equity 2010 
Firm-
characteristic 
 variables 
         
Gazelle 0.366** 
(0.168) 
0.323** 
(0.169) 
0.259 
(0.170) 
0.241 
(0.171) 
0.046  
(0.339)  
0.140 
(0.349)    
0.059 
(0.312) 
0.035 
(0.322)    
Highgrowth 0.340*** 
(0.121) 
0.346*** 
(0.123) 
0.237** 
(0.124) 
0.239** 
(0.125) 
0.447** 
(0.214)    
0.356 
(0.225)    
0.519*** 
(0.193)    
0.496*** 
(0.197)    
Sizeclass 0.074 
(0.128) 
0.073 
(0.129) 
0.248** 
(0.130) 
0.251** 
(0.130) 
-0.011 
(0.241)  
0.030 
(0.246) 
-0.250 
(0.241)    
-0.237 
(0.244)  
Lnage 0.179** 
(0.076) 
0.152** 
(0.077) 
0.043 
(0.078) 
0.032 
(0.079) 
-0.158 
(0.164)  
-0.121 
(0.171)  
-0.017 
(0.135)  
-0.024 
(0.139) 
Applyequity / 
Applyloan 
1.442*** 
(0.296) 
1.528*** 
(0.307) 
0.998*** 
(0.228) 
1.001*** 
(0.229) 
1.067*** 
(0.221)    
1.173*** 
(0.240)    
0.787*** 
(0.169)    
0.795*** 
(0.170)    
Own 0.269** 
(0.125) 
0.288** 
(0.136) 
0.326*** 
(0.127) 
0.364*** 
(0.138) 
-0.787* 
(0.424) 
-1.008** 
(0.479)    
-0.088 
(0.236)  
-0.011  
(0.253)   
Bankfail 2007   1.147* 
(0.706) 
1.142* 
(0.694) 
    
Constant -1.038*** 
(0.237) 
-0.739*** 
(0.276) 
-0.841*** 
(0.242) 
-0.690** 
(0.283) 
-2.075*** 
(0.503)    
-2.565*** 
(0.618)  
-2.126*** 
(0.425)    
-2.096*** 
(0.503)    
Sectoral 
dummy 
Variables 
        
Industry  -0.081 
(0.187) 
 -0.089 
(0.192) 
 0.340 
(0.408)  
 0.182  
(0.315)   
Selected 
Services 
 -0.225 
(0.158) 
 -0.116 
(0.162) 
 0.188 
(0.370) 
 -0.113 
(0.281)    
ICT Services  -0.733*** 
(0.232) 
 -0.266 
(0.226) 
 0.788* 
(0.443)  
 0 .184 
(0.361)  
Professional, 
Scientific and 
Technical 
Services 
 -0.275 
(0.207) 
 -0.230 
(0.213) 
 0.757* 
(0.441) 
 -0.103 
(0.373) 
N 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 
Log likelihood -523.557 -517.37 -490.845 -489.844 -104.358 -101.103 -132.330 -131.167 
Χ
2
 48.86 61.23 43.19 45.19 42.73 49.24 31.59 33.92 
Sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Multivariate probit regressions with selection are estimated in all cases. The dependent variable in all 
models is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm applied for finance, and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** 
implies significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Estimated probit regression coefficients for ‘success in obtaining bank loan’ models. 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
Bank Success 
2007 
Bank Success 
2007 
Bank Success 
2010 
Bank Success 
2010 
Firm-characteristic 
 variables 
    
Gazelle 0.032 
(0.309) 
-0.009 
(0.312) 
0.260 
(0.283) 
0.259 
(0.290) 
Highgrowth -0.096 
(0.222) 
-0.061 
(0.228) 
-0.167 
(0.201) 
-0.207 
(0.206) 
Sizeclass 0.736** 
(0.309) 
0.688** 
(0.310) 
0.103 
(0.212) 
0.100 
(0.215) 
Lnage 0.286* 
(0.154) 
0.273* 
(0.155) 
-0.003 
(0.136) 
0.005 
(0.140) 
Applyequity / Applyloan -0.428 
(0.293) 
-0.436 
(0.297) 
-0.759*** 
(0.287) 
-0.791*** 
(0.293) 
Own 0.209 
(0.251) 
0.297 
(0.278) 
-0.129 
(0.205) 
-0.148 
(0.233) 
Constant 0. 152 
(0.470) 
0.138 
(0.519) 
0.094 
(0.422) 
-0.469 
(0.509) 
Sectoral dummy 
Variables 
    
Industry  0.341 
(0.363) 
 0.808*** 
(0.334) 
Selected Services  0.052 
(0.289) 
 0.523* 
(0.284) 
ICT Services  -0.277 
(0.452) 
 0.958** 
(0.413) 
Professional, Scientific 
 and Technical Services 
 -0.175 
(0.381) 
 0.641* 
(0.377) 
No. observations 310 310 256 256 
Log likelihood -124.859 -123.416 -172.111 -168.057 
Χ
2
 14.09 16.98 10.67 18.78 
Sig. 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.04 
Multivariate probit regressions with selection are estimated in all cases. The dependent variable in all 
models is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s loan application was successful, and 0 if refused. 
*, **, *** implies significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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